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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this study is to provide an update to 
the research team’s 2016 report “Electricity Customer 
Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has Outperformed 
Traditional Monopoly Regulation” using data for 2016 
through 2018. 
KEY FINDINGS:
1.  Since 2011, Ohio consumers have saved 
$23.9 billion because of deregulation. Of 
this total savings, $19.5 billion resulted from 
competitive auctions driving down the price of the 
utilities’ Price to Compare (PTC). These savings 
are realized by Ohio electric consumers who 
obtain their power from the default generation 
service that sets the price for this utility service. 
An additional $4.4 billion has been saved by 
consumers who contracted with Competitive 
Retail Electric Service (CRES) providers or 
governmental aggregators and were able to 
negotiate electricity prices below the PTC.
  The 2016 report analyzed data through 2015 and 
estimated that Ohio consumers had saved about 
$3 billion per year, $15 billion in total, through 
deregulation between 2011 and 2015. That  
report set forth two types of savings: 
 •  “Shopping” are those costs avoided through 
purchasing electricity from a CRES provider, 
rather than defaulting into the Standard 
Service Offer (SSO) (used to create the PTC). 
 •  “SSO Auction” are the savings resulting 
from utilities setting their SSOs through a 
competitive auction process, rather than the 
traditional cost-based accounting method 
that was used in Ohio before deregulation.
Total Savings Due to Deregulation in Ohio 
2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Below is the update analyzed pricing data from 2016-
2018. Total savings over the three years was around 
$9 billion. 
Total Savings Due to Deregulation in Ohio 
2016-2018 (millions of dollars)
Year Shopping SSO Auction Total
2011 $496.70 $2,395.00 $2,891.70
2012 $443.29 $2,366.00 $2,809.29
2013 $744.11 $2,342.00 $3,086.11
2014 $824.21 $2,380.00 $3,204.21
2015 $645.19 $2,339.00 $2,984.19
Total $3,153 .30 $11,822 .00 $14,975 .30
Year Shopping SSO Auction Total
2016 $540.77 $2,553.90 $3,094.67
2017 $403.59 $2,502.10 $2,905.69
2018 $353.45 $2,612.60 $2,966.05
Total $1,297 .81 $7,668 .60 $8,966 .41
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Total Savings from Deregulation in Ohio 
2011-2018 (millions of dollars)
2.  Competition has driven down average 
electricity prices in deregulated Midwestern 
states (Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois), while 
their regulated peers (Indiana, Michigan, 
Wisconsin) have seen a steady increase in 
price of generated electricity. Ratepayers 
in these regulated states are saddled with 
the cost of aging, uneconomic power plants, 
while competitive markets in the deregulated 
states have incentivized investment into new 
efficient and cost-effective generation and 
have accessed wider multi-state markets for 
generated electricity. Deregulation has also led 
to the adoption of dynamic pricing programs 
and more renewable energy resource offerings.
  Competitive markets have proven to be 
a powerful tool to deliver value to Ohio’s 
ratepayers. Competitive rates are attractive 
to businesses looking to locate in Ohio. Any 
attempt to derail competitive generation markets 
would cause significant harm to all of Ohio’s 
electric consumers and to Ohio’s economy.
3.  The Study Team anticipates that savings  
will continue for the near term to be 
around $3 billion per year. However, these 
savings may be lost, in whole or in part, 
if deregulated energy markets continue 
to be undermined by cross subsidies of 
uncompetitive Investor Owned Utility (IOU) 
generation through Electric Distribution 
Utility (EDU) riders and surcharges, or 
through legislatively-mandated, above-
market Power Purchase Agreements 
 (PPAs) and subsidies.
  Despite the many benefits of competition,  
there have been continuing threats to 
deregulated electricity markets in Ohio.  
Investor Owned Utilities have used Ohio’s 
regulatory system to obtain cross-subsidies  
to support their unprofitable generating facilities 
through riders and surcharges collected by  
their regulated Electric Distribution Companies 
on consumers’ bills. 
  The costs charged to Ohio consumers through 
these riders and surcharges are not directly 
related to the purchase of electric power itself. 
These efforts have served to undermine the 
billions of dollars of benefits consumers have 
realized from competitive markets and have 
prevented consumers from realizing the full 
benefits from deregulation. 
Shopping SSO Total
$4,451 .11 $19,490 .60 $23,941 .71
*  Energy Information Agency (EIA) data, together with brokerage 
data from aggregated private contracts, and aggregator pricing 
discounts from the Price to Compare, were used to estimate 
the total savings realized from competitive generation markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
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I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2016, Cleveland State University’s 
Energy Policy Center, in partnership with The 
Ohio State University’s John Glenn College of 
Public Affairs and the Northeast Ohio Public 
Energy Council, released the report “Electricity 
Customer Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has 
Outperformed Traditional Monopoly Regulation.” 
At that time, some investor-owned utilities were 
advocating reregulation of electric generation in 
Ohio, reverting to the traditional vertically integrated 
monopoly model that defined the electricity industry 
for most of the 20th century. The report found that 
such a reversion would likely cost Ohio consumers 
around $15 billion dollars over the ensuing five years. 
Indeed, the report demonstrated that deregulation 
had saved Ohio electricity consumers over  
$14 billion between 2011-2015 as a result of 
competitive generation markets.1 
This updated study was undertaken to determine 
if the projected savings from 2016 to present 
had in fact materialized, and if not, what changes 
have occurred since 2015 that may be affecting 
competitive retail electricity markets. This new 
study has been conducted by the same team  
that researched and produced the 2016 report.
As of the spring of 2019, Ohio’s electricity markets 
remain competitive. However, there continues to 
be regulatory and legislative activity that threatens 
the health, if not the existence, of competitive retail 
electricity markets in Ohio. These threats include, 
among other activities, the cross subsidization of 
generation through surcharges and riders applied 
to Ohio ratepayers by reregulating at least a portion 
of Ohio’s electricity generating capacity. Shifting a 
portion, if not all, of generation costs to regulated 
rate-making undermines the efficient operation of 
Ohio’s electricity generation market and will cost 
consumers money. Moreover, subsidized generation 
bid into the utility Standard Service Offer (SSO) 
auctions depress Ohio’s “Price to Compare (PTC),” 
the rate which competitive retailers must beat to sell 
electricity. An artificially suppressed PTC reduces 
the available “headroom” for CRES providers to 
show value to customers while delivering acceptable 
margins. This may in turn cause aggregators, 
brokers and commercial retail electric service 
(CRES) providers to leave Ohio’s market, easing 
competitive pressure on the IOUs. This will result 
in price increases that will be unchecked by 
competition. Ohio would return to its old system of 
regulated rate making where the cost of purchased 
electricity is augmented by a guaranteed rate 
of return that is approved by the Public Utility 
Commission of Ohio (PUCO) – a system that our 
2016 Report showed would have cost ratepayers 
billions of dollars had it been continued.
1  Thomas, et al. (2016). “Electricity Customer Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has Outperformed Traditional Monopoly Regulation.” 
Retrieved from https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2420&context=urban_facpub 
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2  Nader, Jordan and Seryak, “FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. Recommended Changes to Wholesale Electricity Markets to Address Power 
Plant Subsidies.” Runnerstone, May 16, 2019. https://ohiomfg.informz.net/ohiomfg/data/images/PJM%20memo-may2019.pdf
What is currently an unregulated multi-state market 
for electricity generation will devolve into a partially 
regulated generation market. Think of electricity 
that is being consumed at any point in time as a 
large pool of electrons. Currently the pool is filled 
by competitive purchases of electricity on an open 
market with the first electrons that enter the pool 
coming from the cheapest source of supply. If 
demand is greater than supply after the lowest 
cost electrons spill into the pool, then the next 
cheapest source will continue to fill the pool. This 
goes on until supply meets demand and the cost of 
the last electrons to enter the pool can be thought 
of as determining the cost of power. In reality it is 
the average cost of all of these tranches of power 
that determines the price. Electricity generating 
capacity that is above the market determined price 
does not enter the pool.
There are five reasons why the cost of 
electricity generation will increase in a 
reregulated market:
•  If the state legislature mandates that power 
that is purchased with above-market rate PPAs 
be the first electrons to spill into the pool, 
then the most expensive power enters first 
and displaces cheaper power. It makes no 
difference if this power comes from subsidized 
nuclear plants or new utility scale solar farms. 
The trouble stems from the mandated above-
market PPAs, coupled with subsidy. The power 
that will be rationed out of the pool is likely to 
be the next most expensive power source. 
Arithmetic and the calculation of average 
and marginal costs ensures a higher price of 
purchased power under the reregulated regime 
than under the existing competitive system. 
•  The second reason why we expect the cost 
of electricity generation to increase if the 
market is either partially or fully reregulated is 
that protected sources of generation will have 
reentered the world of cost-plus pricing and  
will lose their incentive to hold down costs.
•  A third wave of cost increases will come from 
the capacity markets. PJM Interconnection, 
the regional transmission organization 
that covers Ohio, runs auctions for power 
generation and from reserve generation 
capacity (termed capacity markets), in addition 
to auctioning off room in its transmission lines. 
To protect the capacity markets from being 
undermined by state-subsidized power and 
predatory pricing, PJM offsets the cost of the 
subsidy by assessing fees on power users 
in the subsidizing states. Runnerstone, an 
independent energy analytical consulting firm, 
puts this cost at $80 million a year.2
•  The supply-side domino effect will also 
contribute to the long-term increase on the 
cost of power. If the newly protected sources of 
electrons push Ohio-located production out of 
the market, those producers, their employees, 
and their elected officials will call a foul and insist 
on equal protection. If they have either enough 
political power or political sympathy as victims 
of legislatively-enabled market rigging, they too 
may earn above-market PPAs and shove the 
next highest producer out of the pool.
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•  The fifth reason to expect prices to increase 
is the deterrence of new, low cost, sources of 
power from entering the generating market as 
the market is draped in legislatively mandated 
protection. Natural gas generation that is 
not owned by IOUs is, for instance, price 
competitive. This has unleashed consumer 
savings throughout the PJM territory, including 
Ohio. In a flat, or slowly growing power market, 
the return on investment for new generation 
depends on higher cost, inefficient, sources 
of power leaving the market. If higher cost 
power does not leave due to legislative action, 
then there is no room for competitive supply, 
investment will not take place, and prices 
will rise once again.3 The cumulative effect is 
higher profits for the legacy power producers, 
increased costs for consumers, and diminished 
economic prospects for Ohioans. Protected 
power generation is an anti-economic 
development policy.
We estimate that deregulation of retail electricity 
markets has delivered $8.7 billion in savings to 
Ohio customers from 2016-2018. In total, since 
2011, Ohio’s consumers have saved $23.9 billion 
as a result of electricity deregulation. This updated 
study confirms the continued savings to Ohio 
consumers of about $3 billion per year from Ohio 
electric generation deregulation. These projected 
savings assume that Ohio’s General Assembly does 
not enact legislation that subsidizes uncompetitive 
power generators and does not re-regulate utility 
scale green generating sources owned by IOUs.
3  Siderewicz, William. H.B. 6 Testimony to the Energy Generation Subcommittee of the Energy and Natural Resource Committee of the 
Ohio House of Representatives, April 24, 2019.
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4 Thomas, et al., supra.
5  O’Connor, P. & O’Connell-Diaz, E. (2015). “Evolution of the Revolution: The sustained success of retail electricity competition.” 
COMPETE. Retrieved from: http://www.competecoalition.com/files/COMPETE%20White%20Paper_Evolution%20of%20Revolution_
Final.pdf
6  O’Connor, O. (2017). “Restructuring Recharged: The Superior Performance of Competitive Electricity Markets 2008-2018.” Retrieved 
from https://www.resausa.org/sites/default/files/RESA_Restructuring_Recharged_White%20Paper_0.pdf
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The Study Team’s 2016 report contained a literature 
review highlighting a wide range of studies focused 
on measuring the impact of deregulation on 
electricity prices. These studies concluded that 
deregulation generally led to a decrease in electricity 
prices. The degree and timing of this impact were 
dependent upon the regulatory structure in which 
each competitive electricity market operates.4 Some 
regulatory environments more readily promote the 
transfer of competitive benefits to ratepayers, while 
others limit the opportunities for consumers to realize 
these benefits.
Since 2016, several important new reports have 
emerged that shed additional light on the value of 
deregulation. The first, written by Philip O’Conner 
in 2017, was an update of a 2015 study, and 
directly compares the rate of change in weighted 
average price between regulated and competitive 
markets.5 The 2017 report extends the analysis 
beyond the five Midwestern states originally 
examined, comparing the prices of 35 monopoly 
states to 14 competitive states. Figure 1 shows 
O’Connor’s 2017 findings. The study demonstrates 
that while “all sector” prices in competitive states 
have dropped nearly 18% since 2011, they have 
simultaneously gone up nearly 3% in monopoly 
states, for a 21% difference in growth rates. 
FIGURE 1: Inflation-Adjusted Weighted 
Average Percentage Price Change by  
Rate Class, Choice vs . Monopoly States, 
2008-2016
Source: O’Connor6 
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7  Dormady, et al. (2019). “Who Pays for Retail Electric Deregulation?: Evidence of Cross Subsidization from Complete Bill Data.” The 
Energy Journal, 40(2): 161-194.
8 Id.
9  Morey, Matthew and Laurence Kirsch (2016). “Retail Choice in Electricity: What Have We Learned in 20 Years?” Electric Markets 
Research Foundation. 
10 Id.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW The second study, by Noah Dormady, et al, (2019) 
considers, among other issues, the impact of Ohio’s 
incomplete deregulation on the ability of ratepayers to 
realize the full value of competition.7 Dormady utilized 
complete electricity bill data from the Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio (PUCO) to examine “all-in” 
prices. They found that due to rate-setting practices 
in Ohio, IOUs have been able to recover losses 
incurred from non-competitive power generating 
plants through non-bypassable charges placed 
onto regulated, distribution bills.8 While generation 
prices have significantly decreased in Ohio since 
deregulation, these savings have not always lead 
to a corresponding reduction in total electricity bills 
of consumers. The expansion of non-bypassable 
charges that the PUCO allowed the IOUs to recover 
has masked, in part or in whole, the $3 billion annual 
savings derived from deregulation in Ohio. The lesson 
learned from Dormady et al. applies equally as well 
to electricity regulation and magicians: to understand 
what is happening always watch the other hand. In 
the case of regulation, it is the mandatory costs not 
associated with power generation that takes the 
place of the magician’s hand not holding the scarf.
A third important recent study found that competitive 
markets have additional benefits for all consumers 
beyond better prices. According to Morey, Matthew 
and Kirsch (2016), deregulation has expanded the 
adoption of dynamic pricing programs, such as 
time-of-use rates and real-time pricing. These pricing 
options work to improve the allocation of power 
system resources (efficiency), to lower the costs of 
power production, and to improve resource adequacy 
(system reliability).9 Additionally, states with retail 
choice better promote renewable resources both 
through greater investment into renewable generation 
and by providing more options for consumers to 
purchase green energy exclusively.10 
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III. CHALLENGES IN ANALYZING 
ELECTRICITY PRICES
The complex nature of electricity prices creates 
challenges to isolating the effect of competitive 
electric markets on the consumer’s cost of power. 
Due to the way data are collected and reported, 
it can be difficult to separate the regulated and 
deregulated portions of the price. Also confused 
is the reported price of purchasing power (the 
purchased price of electricity without transmission, 
distribution, and other charges), and the “all-in” 
price of power (including generating, transmission, 
distribution, and other mandated charges). In Ohio, 
the mandated charges are referred to as “riders.” 
Regulated utilities generally do not break down 
these costs and report them publicly in a fashion 
that enables easy comparison across service 
territories or states. 
This lack of transparency limits the ability to study 
the effects of deregulation. Most studies, as a 
result of this practice, use reported “all-in” prices 
which encompass both regulated and deregulated 
components (further discussed in Section V). Such 
“bundled” price data are readily available from 
the Energy Information Agency (EIA). However, 
private retail contracts that beat the standard 
service offers are not included in EIA data. As a 
result, any study that relies solely on EIA data will 
likely overstate the generating cost of electricity 
by relying on the standard service offer (SSO) 
and not on the competitive price of power that is 
reflected in bill data. This overstatement increases 
with the amount of power used by a customer. It 
is smallest with residential customers and largest 
with industrial customers and energy-intensive 
users such as data centers. EIA data do not fully 
measure savings from deregulation. 
This study assesses the savings realized both from 
competitive auctions setting the Price to Compare, 
as reflected in the EIA data, as well as from retail 
shopping. Statistical techniques were deployed to 
estimate the impact of deregulation on the Price 
to Compare. These techniques are explained in 
more detail in Section VII. In addition, private retail 
contracts were aggregated and examined  
to estimate the savings from shopping. In Ohio, 
57% of consumers, accounting for 79% of the  
total consumption, shop for their power,11 and in  
so doing, over time generally beat the PTC. 
11  PUCO. (2019). Retail Market Activity: Switching Rate Percentage (Customer Count). https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiMjU1Z 
WRkNGUtYmJmZS00YTEyLTk5NWYtMGE1NmJmZjYxMzVjIiwidCI6IjUwZjhmY2M0LTk0ZDgtNGYwNy04NGViLTM2ZWQ1N2M3Yzhh 
MiJ9
Update on Electricity Customer Choice in Ohio 15
12  Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. (2013). “In The Matter of the Commission’s Review of Customer Rate Impacts from Ohio Power 
Company’s Transition to Market Based Rates.” PUCO Case Number 13-1530-EL-UNC, Attachment 1A. Retrieved from: https://dis.
puc.state.oh.us/CaseRecord.aspx?CaseNo=13-1530. 
To capture this additional value to consumers 
from shopping, the Study Team aggregated 
data from private sources for larger “mercantile” 
users of electricity (customers that use more 
than 700,000 kilowatt hours (kWh) a year). The 
effects of deregulation on smaller “non-mercantile” 
consumers (residential and some commercial 
users) in Ohio were estimated by applying 
the discount rates negotiated by a municipal 
government aggregator, Northeast Ohio Public 
Energy Council (NOPEC) through 2017. These  
rates were assumed to be representative of  
savings offered to non-mercantile electricity 
shoppers across the state.
For mercantile customers, the Study Team  
used broker data aggregated from Competitive 
Retail Electric Service (CRES) retail energy  
supply contracts. Data were gathered from  
over 1,000 accounts and aggregated to maintain 
confidentiality. Contracts were gathered from all 
four territories served by Ohio’s investor-owned 
utilities: FirstEnergy, AEP Ohio, Duke Energy,  
and Dayton Power & Light. 
Average load factors and average electricity 
consumption for each of the rate classes were 
used to model electricity prices. This method helps 
create “apples to apples” comparisons between 
each rate class’s PTC and the privately contracted 
cost of generated electricity. This method is 
also consistent with the practices used by the 
professional staff of the Public Utilities Commission 
of Ohio.12 The average load factor assumed for  
the mercantile primary rate class was 67 percent, 
with an average annual consumption, or usage,  
of 3 million kWhs. The average load factor 
assumed for the mercantile secondary rate  
class was 47 percent, with annual usage of  
1 million kWhs. 
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IV. OHIO’S COMPETITIVE MARKET
A .  OVERVIEW OF DEREGULATION IN OHIO
A comprehensive history of Ohio’s path to 
deregulation can be found in the Study Team’s initial 
report posted in 2016. This overview highlights the 
key aspects of Ohio’s restructuring and provides 
context for the ensuing analysis of the state’s 
electricity market.
Ohio’s journey to deregulation began in the 1990s in 
response to increased pressure from commercial and 
industrial users. These users sought greater direct 
access to wholesale markets to decrease costs of 
production and other utility-related expenses. 
Increasing electricity prices during this time period 
threatened Ohio’s manufacturing base, as many 
industrial users began to move out of the state.13 
In 1999, Ohio’s General Assembly passed Senate Bill 
3, which initiated restructuring of the electricity 
generation in the state. The Bill required electric 
utilities to allow consumers to choose their electric 
retail suppliers, beginning in 2001. However, the bill 
mandated a five-year “market development” period, 
which provided utilities time to transition to a 
competitive generation market. During this time, retail 
rates were frozen. After “market development” ended, 
the PUCO extended retail rate freezes through a “rate 
stabilization period,” further delaying the development 
of a competitive retail energy market.14 
In 2007, Ohio’s then-Governor sought to fix the 
regulatory structure in Ohio after determining that 
deregulation was “not working.”15 This was proposed 
under an “Energy, Jobs, and Progress Plan,” with the 
goal of remaking the regulatory structure under which 
utilities operate, and advancing the development of 
renewable energy in Ohio.16 The plan was introduced 
as Senate Bill 221.
Senate Bill 221 introduced market-based ratemaking 
into Ohio’s retail market. The Bill required utilities to 
remain the “provider of last resort,” or the supplier 
that provides default service if a consumer fails to 
choose an alternative provider. The rate paid by 
non-shoppers who retain the default service is called 
the - the “Price to Compare” which is the sum of the 
“Standard Service Offer” and all other by-passable 
riders as approved by the PUCO under Senate Bill 
221. The SSOs are set through a competitive 
13  Thomas, et al. (2016). “Electricity Customer Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has Outperformed Traditional Monopoly Regulation.” 
Retrieved from https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2420&context=urban_facpub 
14  Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. (2007), “Electric Rate Stabilization Plans: Ensuring Rate Certainty in Ohio.” Retrieved from: http://
www.getpurenergy.com/states/forms/Electric%20Rate%20Stabilization.pdf.
15  Littlechild, S. (2007), “Municipal Aggregation and Retail Aggregation in the Ohio Sector.” Retrieved from: http://www.eprg.group.cam.
ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/eprg0715.pdf.
16  Bricker & Eckler. (2008). “Ohio Senate Bill 221: A Summary of Its Advanced Energy and Energy Efficiency Provisions.” Retrieved from: 
http://www.bricker.com/documents/Publications/1533.pdf
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17  Dormady, et al. (2019). “Who Pays for Retail Electric Deregulation?: Evidence of Cross Subsidization from Complete Bill Data.” The 
Energy Journal, 40(2): 161-194.
wholesale energy power market intended to align 
price-to-compare (PTC) rates with wholesale prices 
and allow customers to realize the benefits of 
competition, whether or not they actively shop for 
FIGURE 2: Ohio Electricity Market Restructuring Timeline
Source: Noah Dormady, et al, Ohio State University (2016)
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electricity.17 Since 2011, retail electricity markets have 
grown rapidly in Ohio, as has shopping. Likewise, 
since 2011, the SSO generation auctions have 
attracted considerable competition. 
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B . PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT  
REGULATORY STRUCTURE
While Senate Bill 221 fixed some of the problems 
with Ohio’s first restructuring effort, the regulatory 
structure remained imperfect. The problems 
manifest in two principal ways. First, the legislation 
failed to mandate the complete divestiture of 
generation facilities from Electric Distribution 
Utilities, the latter of which remain fully regulated. 
Rather, SB 221 continued to allow for “corporate” 
separation of regulated and unregulated assets, 
allowing utilities to maintain ownership and control 
over their generation fleet as subsidiary 
corporations.18 With the regulated side of their 
businesses enjoying a guaranteed rate of return of  
as much as 11%, the utilities were incentivized to 
find ways to transfer generation costs to their 
Electric Distribution Utilities, especially as their 
aging generation fleets and their sources of 
generating fuel became increasingly uncompetitive. 
The IOUs were able to use their regulated 
operations to financially support, or cross-subsidize, 
their generation business because of the incomplete 
separation of assets. They also failed to aggressively 
write-down the value of their generating assets with 
the “stranded asset” payments awarded to the 
PUCO. This cross-subsidization diminished the 
benefits that consumers should have realized from 
deregulation. Failing to spin off their uncompetitive 
generating fleets and not tying their values to 
market was a business or financial bet that went 
wrong for AEP, Dayton Power and Light, and most 
disastrously for FirstEnergy. Incomplete separation 
threatens to undermine competitive electricity 
markets in Ohio, including the Standard Service 
Offer auction.
Second, Senate Bill 221 allowed utilities to continue 
to set rates through cost-of-service proposals 
(Electric Security Plans, or ESPs), rather than a 
competitive bidding process (Market Rate Offers, 
or MROs). The Bill provided these two avenues for 
rate-making, but to date, only ESPs have been filed 
with the PUCO. Through ESPs, utilities can assess 
“riders” in the non-bypassable portion of 
customers’ electricity bills, so the charges are 
unable to be avoided through shopping. The 
PUCO’s hearing process for ESPs has resulted in 
the investor-owned utilities getting approval for cost 
recovery measures and cross-subsidization without 
much difficulty.19 Additionally, oversight over how 
the money recovered from these “riders” is 
ultimately spent has been startlingly limited. In 
2017, for instance, the PUCO approved a 
“distribution modernization rider” for FirstEnergy 
customers, through which the utility collected  
$168 million that year. The PUCO did not require 
any specific projects related to grid modernization 
in relation to the collected funds and FirstEnergy 
had not, as of the date this report was finalized, 
reported on how it has used the funds.20 
18  Dormady, et al. (2018). “Do markets make good commissioners? A quasi-experimental analysis of retail electric restructuring in 
Ohio.” Journal of Public Policy, 1-33. Retrieved from: https://doi-org.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/10.1017/S0143814X18000168
19 Id.
20  Kowalski, K. (2018). “FirstEnergy won’t say what it’s doing with Ohio grid modernization money.” Midwest Energy News. Retrieved 
from: https://energynews.us/2018/07/30/midwest/firstenergy-wont-say-what-its-done-with-ohio-grid-modernization-money/
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Indeed, FirstEnergy has made no secret about 
what the distribution modernization rider (DMR) 
money is for: according to testimony FirstEnergy 
provided to the PUCO, the purpose of Rider DMR 
is to provide “credit support” to enable the 
company to be able to, at some future date, 
acquire capital for future distribution upgrades.21  
In short, the funds from the DMR had been 
expressly earmarked to shore up FirstEnergy’s 
failed finances stemming from its uncompetitive 
generation fleet. The PUCO approved this charge, 
awarding FirstEnergy over $600 million in subsidies 
through 2019. FirstEnergy applied with the PUCO 
for a two year extension of this DMR rider.22 
As background to the DMR rider, FirstEnergy  
had previously sought nearly $8 billion in Power 
Purchase Agreements tied to its nuclear and coal 
plants. This was approved by the PUCO, but later 
disallowed by Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission because it put regional electricity  
retail markets at risk. Having failed to get relief  
with above market PPAs, FirstEnergy sought 
21  PUCO, Rehearing Rebuttal and Surrebuttal Testimony of Eileen M. Mikkelson on Behalf of Ohio Edison Company, The Cleveland 
Electric Illuminating Company, the Toledo Edison Company, Case No. 14-1297-EL-SSO, July 25, 2016, at p. 5. 
22 R. Heidorn, Jr., RTO Insider, August 16, 2017, https://www.rtoinsider.com/ohio-puco-firstenergy-47841/
23 Id.
24  See D. Trevas, “FirstEnergy Grid Modernization Charge Improperly Imposed,” Court News Ohio, June 19, 2019, found at:  
http://www.courtnewsohio.gov/cases/2019/SCO/0619/171444_171664.asp#.XSaXpnt7naY. FirstEnergy filed a motion to reconsider 
the ruling, which motion was pending as of the date of this report. 
another end run on deregulation by asking the 
PUCO to approve a “retail rate stability” rider, 
totaling $4.46 billion to support the company’s coal 
and nuclear plants. The PUCO did not grant this, 
but instead gave FirstEnergy the aforementioned 
$600 million DMR.23 In short, FirstEnergy was able 
to obtain subsidies for its upside down generation 
fleet by simply re-characterizing the generation 
subsidy as “distribution modernization.” What they 
lost in a competitive marketplace they clawed back 
through the regulatory process.
The Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council 
(NOPEC), the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association 
(OMA), and others challenged the legality of 
FirstEnergy’s DMR rider, arguing that it was an 
illegal cross subsidy of FirstEnergy’s unregulated 
generation fleet through non-bypassable charges 
collected by its regulated distribution companies. In 
June of 2019, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with 
NOPEC and OMA, determining that the DMR rider 
was an impermissible charge, because, among 
other reasons, FirstEnergy was not required to 
invest the money into modernizing the grid.24
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C . CURRENT STATE OF SHOPPING
The competitive electricity supply industry evolved slowly in Ohio, as the state’s initial regulatory structure 
did not provide an attractive market place for competitors. In 2008, 90% of the megawatt hour (MWh) 
sales in Ohio were purchased by defaulting to the SSOs.25 However, since 2008, Ohio has attracted 
dozens of CRES providers, who have made significant market gains in the past 10 years. In 2018, 79.4% of 
all MWh sold in Ohio were sold through CRES providers, accounting for 57% of all electric power 
customers.26 Figure 3 below shows the growth of shopping in Ohio. In 2018, commercial retail electric 
service providers sold more than 70% of all MWh in each utility territory.27 
FIGURE 3: Percentage of Ohio Energy Sold to Shoppers in Each Utility Territory, 2008-2018
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25  PUCO. (2019). Retail Market Activity: Switching Rate Percentage (MWh Sales). https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiMjU1ZWRkN 
GUtYmJmZS00YTEyLTk5NWYtMGE1NmJmZjYxMzVjIiwidCI6IjUwZjhmY2M0LTk0ZDgtNGYwNy04NGViLTM2ZWQ1N2M3YzhhMiJ9
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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V. RECENT TRENDS IN  
ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Since our 2016 report, there have been two 
significant trends affecting regional competitive 
electricity markets: 1) the closing of some 
uneconomic power plants and a subsequent 
introduction of subsidies to support a few of the 
remaining plants; and 2) a push towards increased 
choice and new efforts for restructuring. 
A . PLANT CLOSURES AND SUBSIDIES
As independent power producers invest into 
efficient, cost-effective generation facilities, natural 
gas prices remain low, load remains flat, and 
society’s demand for renewable energy increases, 
utilities are facing difficulty profiting from older, 
coal-fired and nuclear power plants. The electricity 
generated from these plants struggles to compete 
on the wholesale market. 
The unhealthy economic status of older generation 
facilities has forced many utilities to shutter 
plants ahead of schedule. Most recently, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) chose to retire 
its Paradise and Bull Run coal plants in Kentucky 
and Tennessee respectively. TVA’s board faced 
great political pressure to keep them open, as the 
country’s mix of fuel used to generate power has 
become an increasingly politicized topic. However, 
TVA’s president made clear that the decision was, 
“not about coal. Rather, this decision is about 
economics.”29 TVA serves southern Kentucky 
and a connecting piece of southwestern Virginia; 
residents of most of Tennessee, as well as those 
who live in adjoining western North Carolina, are 
TVA’s customers; sophisticated manufacturing 
employers in northern Mississippi benefit from 
TVA’s rates, as do those in northern Alabama’s 
Muscle Shoals and Huntsville regions. Chattanooga 
and Atlanta’s northern suburbs are also customers 
of TVA. In other words, a good portion of Ohio’s 
day-to-day economic competition purchases 
power from TVA. 
Free market reality has driven utilities to demand 
subsidies to support their uneconomic generation 
facilities. Such subsidies have been the source of 
much debate on both the federal and state level, 
with stakeholders battling over the validity of utility 
arguments around the value of the uneconomic 
plants. Utilities contend that both coal and nuclear 
fueled power generation are key to system 
reliability and resiliency as they provide baseline 
generation and create fuel diversity.30 Supporters 
of nuclear subsidies also argue for the fuel source’s 
importance to meet low emission goals. 
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32  The Investor Owned Utilities were also successful in getting the Ohio General Assembly to propose bailouts through HB 239 and SB 
155, which were never passed. 
33  Kowalski, Kathiann. (2017). “As Ohio legislature regroups, power plant subsidy debate to continue.” Energy News. Retrieved 
from: https://energynews.us/2017/08/16/midwest/as-ohio-legislature-regroups-power-plant-subsidy-debate-continues/. In 2018 
FirstEnergy was released from its obligations under these plants by federal bankruptcy court. See: https://www.cleveland.com/
business/2018/05/firstenergy_solutions_wins_cou.html
34  Lawson, Greg. (2017). “Utility Subsidies Hurt Competition and Hurt Ohio.” The Buckeye Institute. Retrieved from: https://www.
buckeyeinstitute.org/research/detail/the-buckeye-institute-utility-subsidies-hurt-competition-and-hurt-ohio#_ftn1. The Ohio Supreme 
Court upheld the PUCO’s right to cross subsidize the OVEC charges to distribution bills. See: D. Trevas, “Court Approves Ohio 
Power Company Rate Plan,” Ohio Court News, November 27, 2018, found at: http://www.courtnewsohio.gov/cases/2018/SCO/1127/
aep.asp#.XMpQdqZ7mYU
35  Walton, Robert. (2018). “FirstEnergy Solutions files for bankruptcy after pushing for DOE emergency order.” UtilityDive. Retrieved 
from: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/firstenergy-solutions-files-for-bankruptcy-after-pushing-for-doe-emergency/520371/
Numerous states have introduced legislation 
to support coal and nuclear plants, including 
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, 
New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. The Department 
of Energy is also looking into methods of federal 
financial support for the at-risk power plants.31 
In Ohio, IOUs have been repeatedly asking for 
generation subsidies for uneconomic power plants 
through both the PUCO and the state legislation. 
For example in 2016, AEP was able to get the 
PUCO to subsidize aging coal plants in Ohio 
and Indiana.32 These plants, originally built in the 
1950s, are owned by a collective of IOUs, including 
FirstEnergy, Duke, AEP, and Dayton Power & 
Light.33 After Ohio introduced electric competition, 
the utilities voluntarily extended their contract with 
these coal plants through June 2040. The PUCO 
ratemaking ensured that AEP received guaranteed 
income from the plants by shifting the risk of the 
utilities’ decision making in a competitive market 
to Ohio’s consumers, through their distribution 
bills.34 In other words, AEP was granted an above-
market-rate PPA to shelter AEP’s asset value and 
shareholders from a business decision that went 
bad, even though over half of the power produced 
comes from power boilers located in Indiana and 
even though the decision was made after the Ohio 
legislature encouraged the utility to separate its 
generating fleet from the rest of the company. 
FirstEnergy has championed many of these 
attempts to support aging coal and nuclear 
facilities. The Northeast Ohio investor-owned 
utility has been hit particularly hard changes in 
the relative cost of fuels used to produce electric 
power. The utility’s unregulated generation 
subsidiary, FirstEnergy Solutions, filed for 
bankruptcy in March of 2018 as a result of its 
dependence on uncompetitive coal and nuclear 
plants. The bankruptcy occurred after a failed 
appeal to the Department of Energy to issue an 
emergency order for cost recovery.35 
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B . INCREASED CONSUMER CHOICE
Recent years have seen a significant increase in states taking measures to transition from the traditional 
vertical monopoly structure towards a market with greater choice for consumers. Table 1 outlines the 
various efforts across the country to both introduce and further support competition and choice rather 
than monopolized electricity markets. While some initiatives are top-down, many are being driven 
by citizens and industry demanding greater economic freedom and ability to choose electric service 
providers. Not every effort will result in deregulation, but the trend towards choice suggest that  
consumers prefer competitive markets over utility monopolies.
TABLE 1: Highlights of Consumer Choice Across the Country36
State(s) Effort
California Community Choice Aggregators have experienced a rapid expansion and are projected to serve more than 
50% of California’s load by 2020.37 The California Public Utilities Commission is researching an expansion 
of direct access customer choice.
Minnesota New legislation was introduced to provide large industrial consumers the opportunity to purchase 
electricity from market-priced independent power producers.
Missouri Legislation has been introduced to allow Commercial and Industrial consumers over a certain load 
threshold to purchase renewable power.
Washington The state’s Utilities Commission allowed Microsoft to produce energy from independent power producers 
in the wholesale market. Additional efforts are underway to provide similar choice to other large industrial 
consumers.
Florida There is a push to amend Florida’s state constitution to declare that it is the state’s policy to establish 
a competitive market for electricity and provide ratepayers the right to choose their electricity provider 
threshold to purchase renewable power.
Michigan In 2016, Michigan protected its limited choice program against an existential legislative threat. Residents as 
well as commercial and industrial users have shown support for the expansion of the current 10% limit on 
electricity choice.
Arizona, 
Oregon, and 
Virginia
Large commercial and industrial users in each state are increasingly pressuring regulators to initiate or 
expand choice programs.
Nebraska and 
Kansas
Proposed bills in 2017 would unbundle rates and start a movement towards increased retail choice.
36  O’Connor, O. (2017). “Restructuring Recharged: The Superior Performance of Competitive Electricity Markets 2008-2018.” Retrieved 
from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/climate/trump-coal-nuclear-power.html and https://www.resausa.org/sites/default/files/
RESA_Restructuring_Recharged_White%20Paper_0.pdf
37  Bonson, Tyler and Brashares. (2017). “Community Choice Aggregation Expansion in California and its Relation to Investor-Owned 
Utility Procurement.” Center for Climate Protection. Retrieved from: https://cleanpowerexchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
Procurement-Report-May-30-2017.pdf
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VI. DEREGULATION’S EFFECTS ON  
OHIO ELECTRICITY PRICES
A . COMPONENTS OF ELECTRICITY PRICE
The “all-in” price of electricity is comprised of a variety of components: the purchase price of generated 
electricity, capacity or generation reserves, the regulated costs of transmission and distribution, and a 
series of regulatory approved add-on charges called “riders”. In a deregulated electricity market, only the 
generating price of power and capacity charges are directly affected by competition, and they are but 
a portion of the final bill, while other elements remain regulated. The table below provides a high-level 
overview of the major components of electricity price for a commercial customer in Ohio.
TABLE 2: Components of Electricity Price
Price 
Component
Regulated or Deregulated Description
Energy Deregulated, not part of 
Electric Distribution Utility 
cost
The cost of generating electricity. 
Capacity Auction managed by 
PJM, not part of Electric 
Distribution Utility cost
Capacity consists of dedicated generation reserves, designed to “meet 
the demand for the future” and ensure long-term grid reliability. Capacity 
costs are determined in a three-year-ahead annual auction.
Ancillary 
Charges
Managed by PJM, not part 
of Electric Distribution Utility 
cost
Ancillary services result from a range of costs incurred by PJM through 
managing the grid. These charges generally fall into two categories: 
regulation services, which maintain system frequency, and operating 
reserves, which provide back-up power in emergency situations.
Line Losses Not part of Electric 
Distribution Utility costs
Line losses account for energy that is lost while transmitting electricity 
along transmission and distribution lines. 
Transmission Regulated, part of Electric 
Distribution Utility cost
Transmission charges allow utilities to recover the costs of transporting 
electricity from generating plants to distribution systems as well as the 
costs of maintaining the grid. All transmission costs are non-bypassable 
(cannot be avoided through shopping).
Distribution Regulated, part of Electric 
Distribution Utility cost
Distribution accounts for the costs of delivery of low-voltage electricity to 
end-users. These costs are set by state regulators through tariffs. These 
costs include both distribution and demand charges, and cannot be 
bypassed.
Non-Bypassable 
Riders 
Regulated, part of Electric 
Distribution Utility cost
Riders are costs that are assessed with the approval of the PUCO. These 
charges are numerous, vary in purpose, and traditionally small. However, 
they have been growing rapidly in recent years. Non-bypassable riders 
cannot be avoided by shopping.
Bypassable 
Riders
Regulated, part of Electric 
Distribution Utility cost
Bypassable riders are costs generally associated with generation service. 
Shopping customers can avoid these charges if they shop with a CRES.
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VI. DEREGULATION’S EFFECTS ON  
OHIO ELECTRICITY PRICES Each component accounts for a distinct portion of an end-user’s retail electricity price. The relative 
weight of each element has changed since the 
emergence of competitive markets in Ohio. The cost 
structure has shifted significantly since the Study 
Team’s previous report. Figures 4 and 5, below 
show the changing nature of total electricity price for 
shopping mercantile customers in Ohio. Mercantile 
customers are industrial and commercial users that 
consume greater than 700,000 kWh/year.
FIGURE 4: Approximate Structure of 
Electricity Price for Mercantile Users  
in Ohio, 2016
FIGURE 5: Approximate Structure of 
Electricity Price for Mercantile Users  
in Ohio, 2018
Between 2016 and 2018 the energy portion of the 
total bill decreased by 7%, while non-bypassable 
riders portion of the bill increased 7%. This 
continued a trend in the makeup of electricity costs 
for Ohio consumers: as the energy (generation) 
component of the bill decreased in response to the 
pressures of a competitive markets, distribution 
charges and non-bypassable riders have increased 
in response to pressure from IOUs on the PUCO 
to increase the regulated costs, and, of course, the 
noncompetitive profit that comes with regulation. 
Overall, the regulated portion of retail electricity 
prices in Ohio (transmission, distribution, and 
non-bypassable riders) has increased from 35% 
of the total bill to 43%. On the other hand, the 
deregulated components have decreased from 
65% to 57% of the all-in price. This trend is 
discussed further in the below section.
B . ELECTRICITY PRICE TRENDS IN OHIO
1 . Trends in Non-Bypassable Charges 
As described above, the regulated portion of 
Ohio consumers’ electric bills has been steadily 
increasing since the development of a competitive 
retail energy markets. This trend is even more 
pronounced when specific the rate classes from 
specific Electric Distribution Utilities (the local 
distribution subsidiaries of the IOUs) are examined. 
Table 3, below, breaks down percentages of the 
regulated and deregulated portions of the bill for 
AEP, FirstEnergy, and Duke’s Secondary rate 
classes. Rate classes are determined by voltage 
level and the Secondary rate class contains 
a majority of commercial and small industrial 
customers.38 The table compares these percentages 
in 2011 and 2019 to exhibit the market trend. 
Energy
48%
12%
8%
13%
14%
3%
2%
Capacity
Ancillary
Losses
Transmission
Distribution
NBP Riders
Energy
41%
11%
6%
16%
21%
3% 2%
Capacity
Ancillary
Losses
Transmission
Distribution
NBP Riders
38  “Secondary” is a designation by the utility to describe the voltage level delivered to the customer. Secondary is on the “low” side of the 
transformer after it has been stepped down. In AEP territory, the Secondary Rate Class includes nominal regulated voltages of 120, 
120/208, 120/240 or 240/480 volts, single phase and 120/208, 120/240, 240, 240/280, 277/280 and 480 volts, 3 phase.
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TABLE 3: Regulated vs . Deregulated Portions of Total Price for  
Commercial and Small Industrial Customers in 2011 and 201939 
For ratepayers in AEP and FirstEnergy territories, 
the regulated portion of the all-in electricity price 
jumped 17 and 16 percentage points respectively 
from 2011 to 2019. Increases in the regulated price 
components for commercial customers in AEP 
and FirstEnergy’s territory wholly offset the savings 
realized from the competitive generation market. 
On the other hand, Duke only experienced a 6% 
increase in the regulated portion of its bill during 
this same time period. This increase, however, 
coincided with a $0.042 drop in total price 
per kWh. In the Duke territory, unlike AEP and 
FirstEnergy, the deregulated savings were not 
overwhelmed by rising costs on the regulated side. 
2 . Comparison of Price Components in  
Duke and FirstEnergy Territories
A comparison of FirstEnergy’s and Duke’s price 
components makes clear the different experiences 
of secondary rate class customers in the two 
territories. Figures 6 and 7 show the breakdown 
of electricity price for FirstEnergy’s Secondary 
rate class in the utility’s Ohio Edison territory for 
January 2011 and January 2019.
39  The defining characteristics of a “secondary” rate class varies by utility. Generally, this rate class includes primarily large  
commercial users.
AEP CS GS3S FirstEnergy OE Secondary Duke Secondary
2011 2019 2011 2019 2011 2019
Regulated 32% 49% 31% 47% 29% 35%
Deregulated 68% 51% 69% 53% 71% 65%
Total Price/kWh $0.089 $.099 $0.101 $0.102 $0.123 $.081
SSO
65%
17%
14%
4%
Bypassable Riders
Distribution
Non Bypassable Riders
Bypassable
Non Bypassable
Total Price: $0.101/kWh
FIGURE 6: FirstEnergy Ohio Edison 
Secondary (Commercial and Small Industrial) 
Cost Breakdown, January 2011
FIGURE 7: FirstEnergy Ohio Edison 
Secondary (Commercial and Small Industrial) 
Cost Breakdown, January 2019
SSO52%
16%
31%
1%
Bypassable Riders
Distribution
Non Bypassable Riders
Bypassable
Non Bypassable
Total Price: $0.102/kWh
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This comparison between FirstEnergy’s price 
components in 2011 and 2019 describes the nature 
of the dramatic changes in the composition of 
electric bills set forth in Table 3 above. While the 
SSO in FirstEnergy dropped by 13 percentage 
points as a portion of the total cost (a 20% 
decrease), the non-bypassable Riders more than 
doubled over the same time period, from 14% to 
31% of the overall price (increasing by 121%). The 
increase in non-bypassable riders accounts for the 
entirety of the increase in the regulated portion of 
the total price. These riders offset the drop in the 
SSO and prevented ratepayers from realizing an 
overall price decrease.
For comparison, Figures 8 and 9 breakdown the 
total price for Duke’s Secondary rate class.
FIGURE 8: Duke Secondary (Commercial  
and Small Industrial) Cost Breakdown, 
January 2011
FIGURE 9: Duke Secondary (Commercial  
and Small Industrial) Cost Breakdown, 
January 2019
Although Duke’s distribution costs increased by 
9 percentage points, its non-bypassable rider 
percentage fell by 4%, and its overall price fell by 
$0.042/kWh. Duke’s Secondary rate class saw a 
34% decrease in the percentage of its all-in costs 
once a competitive market was established. This is 
a startling contrast to the experience of commercial 
customers in FirstEnergy’s territory. 
3 . Cross-Subsidization
So why did Duke’s ratepayers realize greater 
actual savings benefits from deregulation than 
their counterparts in FirstEnergy territories? A key 
difference between Duke and FirstEnergy is that 
Duke sold off its generation assets to a third party, 
while FirstEnergy (as well as AEP) retained its 
fleet in a wholly owned unregulated subsidiary.40 
In short, Duke functionally separated its Ohio 
regulated business from its deregulated business, 
while FirstEnergy placed its fleet in a wholly owned 
subsidiary company. In other words, Duke sold off 
its fleet while FirstEnergy still owned its generating 
plants. FirstEnergy’s operational structure creates 
incentives for the company to delay marking down 
SSO
34%
36%
11%
15%
4% Bypassable Riders
Transmission
Distribution
Non Bypassable Riders
Bypassable
Total Price: $0.123/kWh
Non Bypassable
SSO
65%
0%
20%
11%
4%
Bypassable Riders (0%)
Transmission
Distribution
Non Bypassable Riders
Bypassable
Non Bypassable
Total Price: $0.081/kWh
40  PR Newswire (2015). “Duke Energy completes sale of its non-regulated Midwest generation business to Dynegy.” Retrieved from: 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/duke-energy-completes-sale-of-its-non-regulated-midwest-generation-business-to-
dynegy-300060392.html
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the asset value of its loss-making generating plants 
and to try to recoup losses from its generating 
subsidiary by using its political power to influence 
the regulatory process. Dormady explains that, 
“Ohio failed to remove generation from the balance 
sheets of utilities yet retained a regulatory rate-
setting mechanism for utilities to obtain additional 
cost recovery that was entirely shielded from 
competitive pressures of retail choice.”41 
Dormady found that overall prices increased in 
every Electric Distribution Utility territory except for 
Duke, which is the only Ohio utility that completely 
divested its generation fleet.42 Dormady points out 
that the decision made by Duke to sell off its fleet 
and the decisions made by FirstEnergy, AEP, and 
Dayton Power and Light to place their fleets in 
wholly-owned subsidiary corporations created a 
“unique natural experiment” in Ohio.43 
Dormady argues that in a competitive market, 
decreases in the price of key generating fuel, like 
natural gas, should deliver savings to consumers. 
However, Ohio consumers outside of the Duke’s 
territory have not realized such savings. Dormady 
postulates that this is because falling natural gas 
prices result in concurrent losses attributed to the 
operations of nuclear and coal generating plants, 
and for the IOUs that still own and operate nuclear 
and coal power plants, there were strong incentives 
to recoup these losses through the regulated side 
of their businesses.44
4 . SSO Trends
Since deregulation, utilities have used a mixture of 
both auctions and cost-based generation (cost-of-
service plus a guaranteed return on investment, 
sometimes referred to herein as the “cost-plus” 
method) approaches to determine the PTC. As 
utilities in Ohio phased in the use of auctions to 
determine their PTCs, the benefits of competition 
have driven down prices. Figure 10 shows how 
a competitive auction process impacted Duke’s 
PTC. In 2011, when Duke transitioned to 100% 
auction pricing, its pricing for secondary mercantile 
customers dropped 37%, from 9 cents a kWh 
to 5.7 cents a kWh. Since 2011, Duke’s PTC in 
this rate class decreased due to the effects of a 
competitive market. The savings totaled 5.2 cents/
kWh in 2019. 
FIGURE 10: Duke Secondary  
(Large Commercial) PTC and  
Average Contract Rate, 2010-2019
Similar trends can be seen in AEP’s Columbus 
Southern territory as the utility begins to phase 
in auction-based pricing (seen in Figure 11). AEP 
phased in its auction pricing over a 12-month 
period. In 2014, still 90% of AEP’s price to compare 
was determined by the cost-plus method. By 
January of 2015, AEP transitioned to 100% auction 
pricing, driving down the price 15%, from 10.16 
cents per kWh to 8.65 cents per kWh. In June of 
2015, AEP’s auction process drove the PTC down 
an additional 32% to 5.88 cents/kWh. Between 
2011 and 2015, auction pricing reduced the PTC in 
AEP’s Columbus Southern secondary rate class by 
Price to Compare
Shift to 100% Auction
$0.00
$0.02
$0.04
$0.06
$0.08
$0.10
2010Jan 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Average Contract Rate
41 Id.
42 Id.
43  Dormady, et al. (2019). “Who Pays for Retail Electric Deregulation?: Evidence of Cross Subsidization from Complete Bill Data.”  
The Energy Journal, 40(2): 161-194.
44 Id. 
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42.13%. By 2019, AEP’s PTC in this rate class was 
down to 5.05 cents per kWh, an additional 14% 
decrease from 2015.
FIGURE 11: AEP Columbus Southern 
Secondary (Large Commercial) PTC and 
Average Contract Rate, 2010 - 2019
While the introduction of competition is the key 
driver behind these falling prices, the decline 
in PTC within the AEP territory is not wholly 
attributable to competitive generation markets. 
Over the same time period, transmission costs 
shifted to the regulated portion of a customer’s bill 
and dropped out of the PTC calculation. However, 
this contribution to the PTC reduction was only a 
fraction of the PTC savings. In 2015, for instance, 
AEP only charged 0.7 cents per kWh for its 
regulated transmission charge.45 That year, AEP’s 
Columbus Southern secondary rate class PTC 
dropped 2.77 cents, meaning that 97% of the drop 
in PTC could be attributed to the introduction of 
competition to the price-setting process.
5 . Avoided Cost and Headroom 
As auction prices and competition reduced 
the PTC, CRES providers are faced with an 
increasingly challenging environment in which to 
45 Based on Broker calculations. 
46  Thomas, et al. (2016). “Electricity Customer Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has Outperformed Traditional Monopoly Regulation.” 
Retrieved from https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2420&context=urban_facpub
Utility 2016 2017 2018
AEP 6% 11% 11%
Duke 14% 10% 7%
DPL 3% 1% -1%
FirstEnergy 13% 10% 16%
Average 9% 8% 8%
compete. As the PTC and contract rate converge, 
avoided costs through shopping shrink. In 2011, 
the early stage of competitive markets, avoided 
costs in all utility territories across Ohio averaged 
22%.46 As markets matured, avoided costs quickly 
dropped. Table 4 sets forth the avoided costs for 
the Secondary Mercantile market in each utility 
territory. In the last three years, avoided costs 
appear to have stabilized at around 8% in this rate 
class. Additional data on avoided costs from 2011-
2018 can be found in Appendix 1.
TABLE 4: Average Avoided Costs from 
Shopping in Secondary Mercantile Markets 
By Utility Territory 2016-2018
As competitive markets mature, we should expect 
that avoided costs will be reduced as an equilibrium 
price is reached. That is how competitive markets 
work. The broader goal of competition is to drive 
efficiency and put downward pressure on prices. 
Lower avoided costs are indicative of success 
in achieving this goal. However, the headroom 
between the PTC and contract prices must remain 
high enough to encourage aggregators, brokers, 
and CRES providers to compete and survive in 
the market. It is for this reason that subsidies for 
generation, especially that generation bid into the 
SSO auctions, pose a considerable threat to the 
electricity markets in Ohio. If the CRES providers, 
aggregators, and brokers leave the market, then 
competitive pressure will ease and prices will rise 
once again.
Price to Compare
100% Auction
Begin Shift to Auction
$0.00
$0.02
$0.04
$0.06
$0.08
$0.10
$0.12 
2010Jan 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Average Contract Rate
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EIA utility data are limited in their ability to account 
for the full effect of deregulation, insofar as the 
data fail to include savings from private contracts 
due to shopping. Even so, the EIA data provide 
relevant information for studying the savings from 
introducing competition into the SSO auctions. As 
shown in our 2016 study, savings from standard 
service auctions provide the biggest overall savings 
to ratepayers, including for those who do not shop. 
In this updated report, the Study Team utilized 
two statistical tests to estimate the impact of 
deregulation on the PTC in Ohio. These analyses 
are similar to those conducted by the Study Team 
in 2016, updated with data through 2017 (the last 
year of available EIA data at the time of the tests 
were run). 
Combating relatively high electricity prices 
has been the primary motivation behind state 
deregulation. It stands to reason that states with 
historically higher mean prices are more likely to 
be among the states that deregulated generating 
markets in an attempt to bring the relative cost 
of electricity down. We know that this was the 
motivation for deregulation in Ohio. 
A . SIX MIDWESTERN STATES
By comparing states that are similar to each other, 
we can better distinguish the effect of deregulation 
VII. INTERSTATE COMPARISON:  
REGULATED VS. DEREGULATED STATES
on electricity price. Ohio is geographically 
surrounded by states with similar economies, 
energy systems, and varied regulatory statuses. 
Accordingly, we focused our analysis on Ohio’s 
regulated and deregulated neighbors. We analyzed 
mean electricity prices in Indiana, Michigan, 
and Wisconsin (regulated states) and compared 
them to prices in Ohio, Illinois, and Pennsylvania 
(deregulated states). 
We began our analysis of changes in the price  
of electricity among this set of Midwestern  
states in 2003. This is the year that O’Connor  
and O’Connell-Diaz (2015) demonstrated that  
true competitive markets began to develop in  
the Midwest.47 
Table 5 shows the results of a two-way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) test. This analysis provides two 
key conclusions. First, after deregulation began 
to take hold in 2003, the mean price of electricity 
in the deregulated states decreased from 11.9 
cents/kWh to 10.2 cents/kWh. Second, during 
that same time period, the mean price of electricity 
in the regulated states increased from 9.9 cents/
kWh to 10.1 cents/kWh. While the mean price in 
deregulated states remains slightly higher reflecting 
its higher starting point, the price trend is indicative 
of the downward pressure competition has put on 
electricity prices. 
47  O’Connor, P. & O’Connell-Diaz, E. (2015). Evolution of the Revolution: The sustained success of retail electricity competition. 
COMPETE. Retrieved from: https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/publications/evolution-revolution-sustained-success-retail-electricity-
competition. Note that Ohio, which deregulated in 2001, did not really see markets develop until after SB 221 was passed in 2008. 
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TABLE 5: Effects of Deregulation on Midwest 
Electricity Prices in All Sectors Combined 
Average Mean Cost of Electricity per Kilowatt 
Hour, 1990-2017
Figure 12 shows the mean electricity price of 
each of the two groups of Midwestern states in 
our analysis from 1990 to 2017. The price spread 
between the deregulated and regulated states was 
fairly consistent throughout the 1990s. However, 
once competition developed in the Midwest in 
2003, the relationship between the two groups 
began to change. As the benefits of deregulation 
took effect, the prices begin to converge from 
2002 to 2003. And, between 2010 and 2011 the 
average price in the deregulated states fell below 
the average price in the regulated group of states. 
The two distinct price trends provides insight how 
the power of deregulation and competition has 
performed compared to regulation in the Midwest.
FIGURE 12: Mean Electricity Prices in All 
Sectors in Six Midwestern States, 1990-2017
B . DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS
The difference-in-difference model statistically 
isolates the impact of deregulation between the 
two sets of Midwestern states by removing path 
dependencies. Historical cost structures and 
regulatory regimes tend to put future prices and 
operating costs on a pre-determined path relative 
to other states. Hence, the electricity price in any 
year is closely tied to the previous year’s price. The 
difference-in-difference model estimates the effects 
of deregulation, isolating it from previous.
A key aspect of a difference-in-difference model is 
determining the inflection point, which is when the 
event that is hypothesized to have disrupted the 
previous path occurred. In our case, it is the year in 
which competition in electricity generating markets 
began in Ohio. While Senate Bill 3 restructured 
Ohio’s generation markets in 1999, the bill failed to 
enable the development of true competition due to 
price freezes and a “market development” period. 
***Statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
Real 2018 dollars
Regulated States 
IN, MI, WI Mean 
(Standard Error)
Deregulated States 
OH, IL, PA Mean 
(Standard Error)
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TABLE 6: Average Price per kWh under Two Assumptions about When Deregulation Began
2003 2009
Prices before 
Deregulation
Prices after 
Deregulation
Difference Prices before 
Deregulation
Prices after 
Deregulation
Difference
Deregulated States 0.1193 .1022 -0.0171 .1146 .1007 -0.0139
Regulated States 0.0994 0.1008 0.0014 .09830 .1040 0.0057
Difference in 
Differences
-0 .0185 -0 .0196
***The interaction term was significant at the p < 0.001 level in the case of either 2003 or 2009 being the year that deregulation took 
effect. All prices adjusted for inflation.
48 Id.
49  The more formal methods of propensity score matching and the Jenks natural breaks algorithm for dividing data into homogenous 
classes were also used to select groupings of regulated and deregulated states most like Ohio with regard to generation capacity 
per capita, mix of resources for electricity generation, and unit fuel costs. Accordingly, a difference-in-difference analysis performed 
on data for these states (MI, NV, VA, VT, WI, and NC on the regulated side and OH, IL, ME, and PA on the deregulated side) 
determined savings in the deregulated states due to competition of 1.33 cents/kWh, using 2003 as the inflection point, and 1.26 
cents/kWh using 2009 as the year competition began. Thus, the savings identified in our difference-in-difference model of Ohio and 
its neighboring states is not an artifact of the selection of neighboring regulated and deregulated states.
50  An additional small increase in the total difference comes from using a different measure of inflation in the latest study. The first study 
assumed a constant 2% rate of inflation, which is reasonable given that this is the rate targeted by the Federal Reserve. However, 
for the latest study we instead used the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI for Electricity for All Urban Consumers which better controls 
for the between-year variability in the price level for electricity. This measure of the change in the price level for electricity in particular 
from one year to the next averaged approximately 2.2% during the study period. See https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2019/
january/fed-inflation-target-2-percent. See also https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CUSR0000SEHF01
Ohio’s complicated and winding journey towards 
true competitive markets makes it difficult to 
pinpoint when the effects of competition finally took 
hold in the state. Accordingly, we conducted two 
analyses with distinctly different inflection points. 
In one test, we used 2003, the year O’Connor 
and O’Connell-Diaz stated that deregulation took 
hold generally in the Midwest.48 In the other, we 
used 2009, the year after SB 221 restructuring 
was enacted, and the first year that Ohio’s utilities 
began to conduct competitive SSO auctions. 
This difference-in-difference statistical modeling 
approach is designed to capture the difference 
between electricity prices in both regulated and 
deregulated states (the first difference) before and 
after competition began (the second difference), 
and then compare these differences. Table 6 
displays the results from the analysis.49
Using the 2003 inflection point, as proposed by O’Connor and O’Connell-Diaz, the independent effect 
of deregulation is determined to be a savings 1.85 cents per kWh, on average, across all rate classes 
in the three deregulated states. Using 2009 as the year competition began, the independent effect of 
deregulation saved 1.96 cents per kWh, on average, across all rate classes in the three deregulated states.
These results are similar to those found in our 2016 study, which looked at EIA data through 2015 and found 
that the difference after 2009 was around 1.76 cents/kWh between regulated and unregulated markets. The 
small increase since 2015 can be attributed to competition continuing to lower electricity prices.50
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A . SAVINGS CREATED THROUGH 
DEREGULATION, FROM 2011 TO 2015
Our 2016 report analyzed savings from 2011 
to 2015 by separately calculating (1) savings 
resulting from the competitive market’s downward 
pressure on utilities’ Standard Service Offers, 
and (2) shopper’s avoided costs (i.e. savings 
below the Price to Compare or PTC). The latter 
is only realized by consumers that actively shop 
for electricity, while the former is realized by all 
customers of Ohio’s IOUs, whether they shop or 
not. The following tables summarize the Team’s 
findings from the initial report published in 2016. 
Table 7 describes savings from shopping for 
both mercantile consumers (using over 700,000 
kWh/year – i.e. industrial and large commercial 
customers) and non-mercantile consumers 
(residential and small commercial customers using 
less than 700,000 kWh/year). Table 8 summarizes 
savings consumers realized due to falling SSO 
prices, and Table 9 outlines total savings from  
2011 to 2015. The methodology used to calculate 
these savings are provided in Section VII of the 
initial report.51 All industrial consumers, due to  
their high usage, are assumed to be mercantile, 
while all residential consumers are assumed to  
be non-mercantile.
TABLE 7: Total Shopping Savings from 
Mercantile and Non-Mercantile Markets  
from 2011 to 2015 (millions of dollars)
TABLE 8: Savings from Competitive SSO, 
Not Including Shopping from 2011 to 2015 
(millions of dollars)
TABLE 9: Total Savings from Deregulation  
from 2011 to 2015 (millions of dollars)
VIII. ESTIMATED SAVINGS  
DRIVEN BY DEREGULATION
Year Mercantile Non-Mercantile Total
2011 $391.60 $105.1 $496.70
2012 $324.69 $118.6 $443.29
2013 $600.81 $143.3 $744.11
2014 $664.21 $160.0 $824.21
2015 $487.19 $157.8 $645.19
Total $2,468 .50 $684 .80 $3,153 .30
Year SSO
2011 $2,395.00
2012 $2,366.00
2013 $2,342.00
2014 $2,380.00
2015 $2,339.00
Total $11,822 .00
Year SSO
2011 $2,891.70
2012 $2,809.29
2013 $3,086.11
2014 $3,204.21
2015 $2,984.19
Total $14,975 .30
51  Thomas, et al. (2016). “Electricity Customer Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has Outperformed Traditional Monopoly Regulation.” 
Retrieved from https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2420&context=urban_facpub
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B . SAVINGS CREATED THROUGH 
DEREGULATION, 2016-2018
In our 2016 study, we projected likely consumer 
savings for the next five years based on our 
findings. The principal purpose of this study is to 
determine if, in fact, those projected savings were 
realized and to determine if market conditions have 
changed in ways that could change the future path 
of savings. 
Accordingly, the Study Team updated the savings 
from deregulation for both shoppers and non-
shoppers in Ohio to include the three years that 
passed since the 2016 study was completed. The 
savings realized from 2016 to 2018 are broken 
down into costs avoided by active shoppers 
and savings delivered to all consumers through 
decreasing SSOs. The Study team utilized updated 
data and methods to determine consumer savings 
from 2016 to 2018.
1 . Avoided Costs from Shopping
The total cost Ohio consumers avoided through 
shopping was estimated by multiplying the 
average avoided cost in both mercantile and 
non-mercantile rate classes by the amount of 
electricity consumed by shoppers in each class. 
All industrial consumers, due to their high usage, 
are assumed to be mercantile customers, while all 
residential consumers are assumed to be non-
mercantile. Commercial customers, due to their 
wide range of usage, can fall into either category. 
Using aggregated and anonymized broker data, the 
team approximated the percentage of commercial 
loads that fell into the mercantile category. Table 10 
provides those percentages by utility service area. 
TABLE 10: Percentage of Commercial  
Load That Was Mercantile from May 2015  
to June 2016
To estimate the total avoided costs from shopping, 
the percentages in Table 10 were assumed to be 
the mercantile percentage of Ohio’s commercial 
load from 2016 to 2018. 
Average avoided cost data for industrial and large 
commercial mercantile customers was calculated 
using broker-derived data, based on actual 
aggregate contracts. The analysis of mercantile 
customers’ savings through shopping from 2016  
to 2018 is presented in Tables 11 and 12, both by 
utility and by year.
TABLE 11: Total Savings through  
Shopping, by Utility, for Mercantile  
Electricity Customers from 2016 to 2018 
(millions of dollars)
Utility % Mercantile
AEP Ohio Power 44%
AEP Columbus Southern 54%
Dayton Power & Light 41%
Duke Energy Ohio 61%
FirstEnergy Ohio Edison 32%
FirstEnergy Toledo Edison 33%
FirstEnergy Illuminating Co. 50%
Utility Savings
AEP $264.44
Duke Energy Ohio $153.79
Dayton Power & Light $45.21
FirstEnergy $607.99
Total $1,071.44
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TABLE 12: Total Savings through Shopping, 
by Year, for Mercantile Electricity Customers  
from 2016 to 2018 (millions of dollars)
In 2016, the Study Team calculated non-mercantile 
savings by applying the flat savings rate guaranteed 
by the Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council 
(NOPEC): 4% off the PTC for commercial users 
and 6% off the PTC for residential users. NOPEC 
continued to provide these same savings rates 
through 2016. In 2017, NOPEC changed its savings 
rates slightly, providing rates that were 4% off the 
PTC for both commercial and residential users. 
By 2018, however, the PTC was such that CRES 
providers were no longer offering rates tied to 
the PTC. (This shows the power of a functioning 
competitive market. The PTC is now so close 
to the market equilibrium price that margins for 
aggregators and brokers are being squeezed. This 
is exactly how markets are expected to work—for 
the financial benefit of consumers.) Aggregators 
and brokers began to use the mercantile model 
of basing their rates upon contracts from CRES 
providers. As a result, the Study Team was unable 
to obtain a data-base for 2018 non-mercantile 
contracts in time for this Study. Accordingly, for 
purposes of this Study, we assumed the savings  
to be zero for that year. 
However, the team was able to analyze non-
mercantile shopping savings for both 2016 and 
2017, assuming that the flat savings rates tied to 
the PTC provided by NOPEC were representative 
of the rates available in the marketplace. Tables 
13 and 14 summarize the savings non-mercantile 
users realized through shopping. 
TABLE 13: Total Savings through  
Shopping, by Utility, for Non-Mercantile 
Electricity Customers from 2016 to 2017 
(millions of dollars)
TABLE 14: Total Savings through  
Shopping, by Year, for Non-Mercantile 
Electricity Customers from 2016 to 2017 
(millions of dollars)
Adding up the savings through shopping from both 
mercantile and non-mercantile consumers, we 
find that shoppers saved $1.29 billion from 2016 to 
2018. Table 15 outlines the total shopping savings 
during this time period.
TABLE 15: Total Shopping Savings from 
Mercantile and Non-Mercantile Electricity 
Users from 2016 to 2018 (millions of dollars)
These savings are realized only by those 
consumers who choose to shop for their electric 
service providers, rather than accept the default 
PTC rate. 
Utility Savings
AEP $56.12
Duke Energy Ohio $33.54
Dayton Power & Light $25.06
FirstEnergy $111.65
Total $226.37
Year Savings
2016 $408.30
2017 $309.69
2018 $353.45
Total $1,071.44
Year Savings
2016 $132.47
2017 $93.90
Total $226.37
Year Mercantile Non-Mercantile Total
2016 $408.30 $132.47 $540.77
2017 $309.69 $93.90 $403.59
2018 $353.45 – $353.45
Total $1,071 .44 $226 .37 $1,297 .81
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While the percentage of shopping consumers is 
increasing, only 57% of all customers purchased 
electricity from CRES providers in 2018.52 On the 
other hand, the savings achieved from competitive 
auctions driving down SSOs are realized by all 
electricity consumers of Ohio, whether they shop 
or not. This excludes those consumers who are 
outside the PUCO jurisdiction (i.e. customers of 
municipal and rural cooperative utilities). These 
consumers comprise a very small fraction of Ohio’s 
electricity users.
2 . Savings from Standard Service Offers
Competitive generation markets have delivered 
savings to all Ohio consumers. The use of a 
competitive auctions in Ohio to determine the 
standard service offer, the main component of the 
Price to Compare, has significantly driven down the 
cost of electric power purchases since 2011.
To estimate the value delivered to consumers by 
the decreasing PTC, we used the savings rate 
from the difference-in-difference model in Section 
VI. We determined that 2009 was the appropriate 
inflection point for Ohio, as it is the first year utilities 
began to use, at least in part, competitive auctions 
to build their standard service offers (SSOs). After 
2009, the estimated cost difference between 
electricity prices reported by utilities to the Energy 
Information Agency (EIA) in the six regulated and 
deregulated Midwest states was an average of 
1.96 cents for each kWh consumed. This savings 
estimate was then multiplied by the total kilowatt 
hours consumed in Ohio in 2016 and 2017. We 
used an estimate of 2018 electricity consumption 
as the basis of that year’s calculation. These 
savings estimates are in Table 16. 
Table 16: Savings from Deregulated SSOs  
in Ohio, Not Including Shopping from  
2016 to 2018 (millions of dollars)
We estimate that all Ohio consumers have saved 
over $7.6 billion from 2016 to 2018 as a result of 
deregulated generation markets driving down  
the PTC.
Year SSO
2016 $2,553.9
2017 $2,502.1
2018 $2,612.6 (estimated)
Total $7,668.6
52  PUCO. (2019). Retail Market Activity: Switching Rate Percentage (Customer Count). https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiMjU1Z 
 WRkNGUtYmJmZS00YTEyLTk5NWYtMGE1NmJmZjYxMzVjIiwidCI6IjUwZjhmY2M0LTk0ZDgtNGYwNy04NGViLTM2ZWQ1N2M3Yzhh 
MiJ9
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Shopping SSO Total
$4,451.11 $19,490.60 $23,941.71
IX. TOTAL SAVINGS FROM  
DEREGULATION, FROM 2011 TO 2018
Tables 17 and 18 provide summaries of the savings 
generated from deregulation from 2011 to 2015 and 
from 2016 to 2018, respectively. Table 19 highlights 
the total savings realized by Ohio consumers  
since 2011. 
We have found that Ohio’s electricity users saved 
$4.45 billion by shopping for their power and 
$19.49 billion by accessing competitive SSOs 
delivered by deregulated electricity generation. 
From 2011 to 2018, Ohio consumers saved  
$23.94 billion as a result of deregulation,  
averaging just under $3 billion a year.
In 2016 we projected savings of around  
$2.8 billion per year for the next five years, based 
upon existing market trends. In fact, savings have 
been closer to $3 billion a year for 2016, 2017 and 
2018. We expect to see these trends continue, so 
long as there are no major impairments to the retail 
markets, such as large-scale cross subsidization 
by regulated Electric Distribution Utilities, price 
supports of uneconomic generation plants, or the 
pre-monopolization of alternative energy generating 
sources by the IOU.
TABLE 17: Total Savings Due to Deregulated 
Electricity Generation Markets in Ohio from 
2011 to 2015 (millions of dollars)
TABLE 18: Total Savings Due to Deregulated 
Electricity Generation Markets in Ohio from 
2016 to 2018 (millions of dollars)
TABLE 19: Total Savings from Deregulated 
Electricity Generation Markets in Ohio from 
2011 to 2018 (millions of dollars)
Year Shopping SSO Total
2011 $496.70 $2,395.00 $2,891.70
2012 $443.29 $2,366.00 $2,809.29
2013 $744.11 $2,342.00 $3,086.11
2014 $824.21 $2,380.00 $3,204.21
2015 $645.19 $2,339.00 $2,984.19
Total $3,153 .30 $11,822 .00 $14,975 .30
Year Shopping SSO Total
2016 $540.77 $2,553.9 $3,094.67
2017 $403.59 $2,502.1 $2,905.69
2018 $353.45 $2,612.6 $2,966.05
Total $1,297 .81 $7,668 .6 $8,966 .41
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X. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this report was to analyze the 
ongoing impact of Ohio’s decision to deregulate 
retail electricity markets. Ohio’s deregulation of 
electricity generation has saved Ohio consumers 
about $24 billion over the past 8 years. Deregulation, 
once championed by investor-owned utilities, now 
faces challenges from these same stakeholders, 
who have been regularly petitioning both the PUCO 
and the Ohio General Assembly for subsidies to 
bailout their loss-making, aging, uncompetitive 
generation fleets. These efforts, if successful, will 
erode the significant benefits and financial savings 
that Ohio’s consumers have realized as a result of 
deregulated electricity generation markets. 
Competitive markets drive innovation and 
investment into new, efficient power plants, 
and subject to the discipline of the market. In 
turn, this reduces generation costs and total 
electricity prices. This impact can be seen in 
our comparison of regulated and deregulated 
Midwestern states. Since competitive markets 
have taken hold, electricity prices in deregulated 
states have decreased, while electricity costs 
in the regulated states have increased. Without 
competition, customers in regulated states were 
locked into old, inefficient, and costly generation 
plants. Competitive markets react more readily to 
economic signals, replacing old facilities with more 
efficient and cost-effective generation. Additionally, 
competitive markets shift the risk of these 
investments to investors. In a regulated market, 
consumers are saddled with the risk of any utility 
rate base investment. This is not to say that social 
and environmental costs of generation choices can 
never be factored into the Price to Compare or to 
energy markets in general. Rather, such costs must 
be reflected in these markets in a manner that does 
not leak into regulated markets, or otherwise impair 
free markets. 
Ohio’s regulatory structure can be improved 
by reducing utility incentives to seek cross-
subsidization for their deregulated legacy generation 
businesses. The best way to accomplish this would 
be to require that utilities fully divest their generation 
assets, as Duke has done, and that the ratemaking 
process include more rigorous oversight over non-
bypassable charges to ensure that generation costs 
or forgone profits do not leak into the regulated side 
of the business.
Competitive markets have proven to be a 
powerful tool to deliver value to Ohio’s ratepayers. 
Competitive rates are attractive to businesses 
looking to locate in Ohio. Efforts to undermine 
the efficiency of these markets, like subsidies for 
uneconomic generating facilities, are a threat to 
Ohio’s economic development and wellbeing. Any 
attempt to derail competitive generation markets 
would cause significant harm to all of Ohio’s 
electric consumers and Ohio’s economy.
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APPENDIX 1 . 
Average Avoided Costs for Secondary Mercantile Customers 2011-2018
Utility 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
AEP 20% 24% 29% 30% 18% 6% 11% 11%
Duke Energy of Ohio 34% 7% 14% 17% 13% 14% 10% 7%
Dayton Power & Light 19% 15% 16% 20% 19% 3% 1% -1%
FirstEnergy 16% 15% 13% 24% 21% 13% 10% 16%
Average 22% 15% 18% 23% 18% 9% 8% 8%
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The Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council (NOPEC) is 
a non-profit natural gas and electric energy aggregation 
representing more than 900,000 residential and small 
business customers in over 230 communities in 17 Ohio 
counties. NOPEC was founded in 2000. NOPEC operates 
as a governmental opt-out aggregation. We use bulk-buying 
techniques to get the most reliable and competitively priced 
energy we can and then supply that power in the form of 
electricity and natural gas to our customers. We estimate 
that since we were founded, we have saved our customers 
in Northeast Ohio over a quarter billion dollars in cumulative 
electric savings. We are also increasingly involved in 
encouraging and implementing energy conservation that 
saves our customers additional money.
